What is the clearest risk from an asset owner leaving voting decision-making in the hands of its fund managers?

The risk of having an asset owner delegate voting decision-making to its fund managers primarily revolves around the potential for inconsistent voting behavior among different managers, especially if a company is held by more than one fund manager within the same investment strategy or across different funds. When multiple fund managers have the discretion to vote shares of the same company independently, this can lead to divergent voting outcomes on key issues impacting corporate governance, shareholder proposals, or other critical matters.

This inconsistency can undermine the asset owner's overall influence and strategy, as the collective voting power is not directed towards a unified stance. It can also reflect poorly on the asset owner's commitment to certain principles or values, as the varying decisions may create an impression of fragmentation in their governance approach.

In contrast, the other options represent different nuances that do not encapsulate the core risk as effectively. While alignment with the investment thesis and accountability are important considerations, they do not directly express the challenge posed by having multiple voices (i.e., fund managers) making potentially conflicting decisions on behalf of the asset owner. Similarly, while losing votes in the voting system is a logistical concern, it does not address the broader strategic implications of divided voting outcomes.